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Chapter 3 
COUNTERFEITING TRUTH: STATISTICAL REPORTING ON THE 
BASIS OF TRUST 
DavidM Levy 
George Mason University 
Sandra J. Peart 
Baldwin-Wallace College 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Semantics and game theory offer modem approaches to very old problems. 1 David Lewis 
introduced game theoretic concepts into the study of language in his examination of conventions. 2 
In this chapter we study the language of a specific sort of conventions: statistical estimators. 
Such estimators have the important property of being both well-defined mathematical objects and 
devices that form the basis of factual claims asserted and, perhaps, believed by rational agents. 3 
The convention we analyze allows econometric reporting to proceed on the basis of trust. 4 In 
'Carnap (1942, pp. v-vi): "Semantical concepts, especially the concept of truth, have been discussed by philoso-
phers since ancient times. But a systematic development with the help of the exact instruments of modern logic has 
been undertaken only in recent years .... On the basis of these preliminary analyses, Alfred Tarski (who is now in 
this country) laid the foundation of a systematical construction." Tarski's work is central to that of Carnap (1942, p. 
vi) and Quine (1940, p. 4), among others. Luschei (1962) is a full-length attempt that uses manuscript and memory 
to recover the contributions of Stanislaw Lesniewski. 
2Barwise & Moss (1996, p. 4): "The philosopher David Lewis uncovered a deep source of circularity in human 
affairs, described in his famous study of convention (Lewis, 1969). All social institutions, from language to laws to 
customs about which side of the sidewalk to use, are based on conventions shared by the community in question. 
But what does it mean for a society to share a convention? Certainly, part of what it means is that those who accept 
some convention, say, C, behave in a given away. But Lewis also argues that another important part of what makes 
C a convention is that those who accept C also accept that C is a shared convention." 
3Lewis (1969, p. 204): "One kind of semantics analyzes truth, analyticity, and the rest in relation to possible 
interpreted languages, in abstraction from any users thereof. This is the kind of semantics done by Frege, Tarski, 
and (most of the time) Carnap .... The other kind of semantics analyzes truth, analyticity, and the rest, in relation 
to an agent or a population of agents. This is the kind of semantics done by the later Wittgenstein, Grice, Skinner, 
Quine, Morris, Ziff, and (sometimes) Carnap." 
4Dewald et al. (1986) first publicly demonstrated how hard it was, even for journal editors, to obtain the data 
used to obtain published estimates. Without the data it is difficult to reproduce the published results. Are publishing 
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contrast with Lewis, we shall demonstrate that such a convention is conducive to conflict rather 
than co-ordination. 
Long before game theory and semantics, indeed, long before economics itself, exchange con-
ducted by means of money was linked to language. In the Republic (371 c) Socrates talks about 
"money as a token for the purpose of exchange." Economists have Jong argued that, for money 
to function as a mechanism of exchange, there must be some assurance-carried by institutions 
and language-of its quality. Our argument is simple. Supposing money and language are inter-
related the way that philosophers and economists often claim they are interrelated, if we do not 
take money solely on the basis of trust, why do we take claims regarding truth on the basis of 
trust? 
There are two parts of our chapter. First, we review Adam Smith's argument that the evo-
lution of monetary institutions is tied up in the problem of detecting deceitful metal offered in 
exchange. Smith points to no such comparable institution by which deceitful policy advocacy 
is detected and severely punished.5 Yet his recommendation for caution in the evaluation of 
policy advocacy points to the caution that routinely prevailed in monetary matters before public 
safeguards evolved to make the metallic content of the medium of exchange transparent and to 
preserve its quality. Second, we tum to a different sort of deceit, in the reporting of statistical 
evidence. We apply Smith's insights regarding counterfeit money to the case of incentives for 
deceit in reporting statistical results. In the production of "truth", there is no evolved institution 
that compares to the Mint. We summarize our recent work regarding how another institution-
competing expert witnesses-might deal with deceitful statistical arguments. 
We juxtapose these two broad topics, money and truth telling, to emphasize the common 
structure they share, that of an institutional framework that relies (rightly or wrongly) on trust 
carried by language. It is important to emphasize, in addition, that these are part of our larger 
enterprise. Economists model ordinary people as seeking the private good of happiness. Yet we 
persist in thinking of ourselves, qua economists, as seeking the public good of truth. And we 
have failed to confront the inconsistency in such a modeling procedure (Peart & Levy, 2005). 
2 ADAM SMITH ON DECEIT 
As economists have only recently re-acquainted themselves with language as an object of 
study (Rubinstein, 2000), a passage from Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence that links money 
and language might not come readily to mind: 
The offering of a shilling, which to us appears to have so plain and a simple a meaning, is 
in reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so and so as it is for his interest. Men 
always endeavour to persuade others to be of their opinion even when the matter is of no 
consequence to them ... (1978, 352) 
If offering money is a form of persuasion wrapped up in the semantic notions of meaning and 
truth, then what is the semantic counterpart of counterfeiting money? 
incentives conducive to truth seeking? This is the subject of the issue of Social Epistemology for which Feigenbaum 
& Levy (1993) served as the jumping off point. 
5Jn an age in which torture was routine state policy, the penalties inflicted upon the attacks on the monetary basis 
of the state were noticeable for their savagery. An attack on the sovereign's monetary authority was viewed in much 
the same light as an attack on the physical body of the sovereign (Kelly, 1981). The juxtaposition of functions of the 
United States Secret Service-protecting the President and combating counterfeit currency-is a surviving instance 
of such an identification. 
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In Chapter 4 of Book I of the Wealth of Nations Smith gives a social evolutionary account of 
the economic institution of money. 6 He explains how metallic commodities came to be used as 
money. This, however, created a set of problems. First, there is the matter of weight: 
The use of metals in this rude state was attended with two very considerable inconveniencies; 
first with the trouble of weighing; and, secondly, with that of assaying them. In the precious 
metals, where a small difference in the quantity makes a great difference in the value, even 
the business of weighing, with proper exactness, requires at least very accurate weights and 
scales. The weighing of gold in particular is an operation of some nicety. In the coarser 
metals, indeed, where a small error would be of little consequence, less accuracy would, no 
doubt, be necessary. Yet we should find it excessively troublesome, if every time a poor man 
had occasion either to buy or sell a farthing's worth of goods, he was obliged to weigh the 
farthing. (I. iv ,7) 
Then there is problem of assaying: 
The operation of assaying is still more difficult, still more tedious, and, unless a part of 
the metal is fairly melted in the crucible, with proper dissolvents, any conclusion that can 
be drawn from it, is extremely uncertain. Before the institution of coined money, however, 
unless they went through this tedious and difficult operation, people must always have been 
liable to the grossest frauds and impositions, and instead of a pound weight of pure silver, 
or pure copper, might receive in exchange for their goods, an adulterated composition of 
the coarsest and cheapest materials, which had, however, in their outward appearance, been 
made to resemble those metals. (I. iv ,7) 
For each problem, a set of solutions is offered: 
To prevent such abuses, to facilitate exchanges, and thereby to encourage all sorts of industry 
and commerce, it has been found necessary, in all countries that have made any considerable 
advances towards improvement, to affix a public stamp upon certain quantities of such par-
ticular metals, as were in those countries commonly made use of to purchase goods. Hence 
the origin of coined money, and of those public offices called mints; institutions exactly of 
the same nature with those of the aulnagers and stampmasters of woollen and linen cloth. All 
of them are equally meant to ascertain, by means of a public stamp, the quantity and uniform 
goodness of those different commodities when brought to market. (I. iv ,7) 
Smith then argues that history can be explained as following an evolutionary pathway: 
The first publick stamps of this kind that were affixed to the current metals, seem in many 
cases to have been intended to ascertain, what it was both most difficult and most important 
to ascertain, the goodness or fineness of the metal, and to have resembled the sterling mark 
which is at present affixed to plate and bars of silver, or the Spanish mark which is sometimes 
affixed to ingots of gold, and which being struck only upon one side of the piece, and not 
covering the whole surface, ascertains the fineness, but not the weight of the metal. (I. iv ,8) 
The inconveniency and difficulty of weighing those metals with exactness gave occasion to 
the institution of coins, of which the stamp, covering entirely both sides of the piece and 
sometimes the edges too, was supposed to ascertain not only the fineness, but the weight of 
the metal. Such coins, therefore, were received by tale as at present, without the trouble of 
weighing. (I. iv ,9) 
6F. A. Hayek's defense of evolved institutions, which develops ideas in David Hume, suggests that all evolved 
conventions are equally useful. This claim, and the response to it, are studied in Peart & Levy (2006). Lewis's 
construction shares Hayek's Humean roots (1969, p. 3), but it does not make such a claim. 
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The passages we omitted above, and those which follow, suggest why it took Smith twenty 
years to complete the Wealth of Nations. He has surely forgotten more about the history of 
coinage than these two readers will ever know. When Smith describes the state policy of debasing 
coinage as a type of fraud, perhaps his readers recalled the proverbial question-who guards the 
guardians? 
The problem of deceit is critical to what might be considered as Smith's public choice view 
of state policy. Needless to say, a policy of state-sponsored monopolies is the systematic target 
of the Wealth of Nations. Smith explains this policy is founded upon preventing deceit. This 
argument appears in the conclusion of Book 1 in which the interests of the different classes of 
society are contrasted. We start with the workers' employers: 
His employers constitute the third order, that of those who live by profit. It is the stock that is 
employed for the sake of profit, which puts into motion the greater part of the useful labour 
of every society. The plans and projects of the employers of stock regulate and direct all the 
most important operations of Jabour, and profit is the end proposed by all those plans and 
projects. But the rate of profit does not, like rent and wages, rise with the prosperity, and fall 
with the declension of the society. On the contrary, it is naturally low in rich, and high in 
poor countries, and it is always highest in the countries which are going fastest to ruin. The 
interest of this third order, therefore, has not the same connection with the general interest of 
the society as that of the other two. (I. xi '1[264) 
Smith appeals to a learning by doing explanation for differential competence: 
Merchants and master manufacturers are, in this order, the two classes of people who com-
monly employ the largest capitals, and who by their wealth draw to themselves the greatest 
share of the public consideration. As during their whole lives they are engaged in plans and 
projects, they have frequently more acuteness of understanding than the greater part of coun-
try gentlemen. As their thoughts, however, are commonly exercised rather about the interest 
of their own particular branch of business, than about that of the society, their judgment, even 
when given with the greatest candour (which it has not been upon every occasion) is much 
more to be depended upon with regard to the former of those two objects, than with regard 
to the latter. Their superiority over the country gentleman is, not so much in their knowledge 
of the public interest, as in their having a better knowledge of their own interest than he has 
of his. (I. xi '1[264) 
This competence has cash value: 
It is by this superior knowledge of their own interest that they have frequently imposed upon 
his generosity, and persuaded him to give up both his own interest and that of the public, 
from a very simple but honest conviction, that their ·interest, and not his, was the interest 
of the public. The interest of the dealers, however, in any particular branch of trade or 
manufactures, is always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the 
public. To widen the market and to narrow the competition, is always the interest of the 
dealers. To widen the market may frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the 
public; but to narrow the competition must always be against it, and can serve only to enable 
the dealers, by raising their profits above what they naturally would be, to levy, for their own 
benefit, an absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow·dtizens. (I. xi '1[264) 
All of this motivates Smith's advice to his readers. Lacking an institution that serves as the 
rhetorical equivalent of the public mint, each citizen must weigh and assay arguments made by 
Counterfeiting Truth: Statistical Reporting on the Basis of Trust 43 
policy makers, just as the quality of metals offered in exchange had been judged in barbarous 
times:7 
The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought 
always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having 
been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most 
suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the 
same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress 
the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed 
it. (I. xi ,264) 
The question to which we now turn is whether competition among deceivers is sufficient to 
solve Smith's problem of deceit in the arena of statistical reporting. 
3 WHAT DOES THE ECONOMIST WANT? 
To model a deceitful philosopher, we need to say what he wants. 8 We represent this issue 
in terms of our previous work on ethics and estimation (Levy & Peart, 2006). In Figure I, we 
present competing preferences over estimates where we model the trade-off between bias and 
statistical efficiency. We depart from the textbook treatment of the goals of statistical research 
and allow bias in one direction to be a desired property of an estimate. A researcher may prefer 
to represent the world one way rather than another. The constraint we imagine follows the simple 
mechanics of specification search or data mining, where one makes many estimates and picks a 
favorite (Leamer 1983, Denton 1985). In particular, these constraints, the replication set, result 
from computing a number of unbiased estimates and mapping out the frontier combination of 
bias and efficiency (Feigenbaum & Levy, 1996). 
We consider two sorts of preferences-Qne for a public-spirited statistician and one for some-
one with both public and private wants. The public-spirited statistician is interested only in sta-
tistical efficiency, a number without a sign. Either the statistician does not care about the value of 
the parameter to be estimated or, perhaps he does care, but he is unwilling to give up any amount 
of statistical efficiency to get a more pleasing estimate. In Figure l, this possibility is described 
by indifference curve JT. For such a statistician the rational estimate is j*. When positive bias 
is a good, however, indifference curves take the shape marked by II. Thus the rational estimate, 
one in which some statistical efficiency is traded away for some gain in bias, is i •. 
The American legal system seems an ideal case to consider such rational choice estimation 
in a competitive context because the motivation for non-transparencies is all-too-obvious. In this 
context, the problem is that contending clients hire expert econometricians to press their case 
before a jury. 
Structural equation estimation is a natural test ground for thinking about how the theorists' 
motivations are affected because the identifying restrictions flow from theoretical insight. It 
is perhaps not a coincidence that structural equation estimation is also fertile ground to study 
deceitful estimation because current conventions do not require the researcher to document the 
consequences of different selections of instrumental variables. 
7This interpretation of Smith might save him from the wrath of George Stigler for having failed to apply the 
full-information self-interested model in political discussion (Stigler, 1971). 
8This section is a largely a summary of the work reported in Levy & Peart (2006) in which we employ the 
motivational claim of a sympathetic statistician who is influenced by the wants of a client 
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Relative Efficiency 
Bias 
Figure 1: Competing rational estimates 
This is the convention which we explore. The regression strategy need not be revealed. We 
need report only the equation system selected from the search. 
Consider a demand and, supply system (D & S) of the following structure: 9 
Quantity = 131+132 Price + j33 Income +11 (D) 
Price = cx1 + cx2 Quantity + CX3 Cost + CX4 Weather + cx5 Politics + e (S) 
We suppose that the statistician has preferences over the estimated value of j32• A researcher 
is required by convention to report only D, mentioning S casually. Thus, one can choose whether 
to include one, two or three exogenous variables from S. The rational choice estimate is the result 
of computing all possible combinations which identify a system and then picking. As above, we 
suppose the client and the sympathetic expert wants both bias and statistical efficiency. We 
measure the efficiency of estimator i by the minimum mean square error [MSE*] of the estimates 
considered relative to the MSE of estimator i; thus, MSE* /MSE;. 
A simulation is provided to give some idea of the ease with which biased estimates can be 
generated by such a selection procedure. There are several technical details. First, what is the 
distribution of the exogenous variables? If they are omitted not only do they change the error 
distribution but also the degree of over-identification, which changes dramatically the property 
of 2SLS estimates (Phillips, 1983). In the case considered, all exogenous variables are assumed 
to be a standard normal. Thus, omitting an exogenous variable in search of a pleasing outcome 
will not change the normality of the resulting errors. 
9The alphas are all I; 131 is 10; 13i is -I; j33 is 3. 
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We consider two types of search. First, there is an unconstrained search for the maximum 
(minimum) value of the estimates of (h In the Tables below this is called "Max" and "Min." 
Second, there is a search which is constrained by the desire to have at least two exogenous 
variables in the supply curve. These are called "C-Max" and "C-Min." This will suggest how 
much the researcher might be willing to give up in efficiency to get bias. 100,000 experiments 
for N=25, 100, 400, 1600 are performed in Shazam 8.0 (White, 1997). 
All of the simultaneous estimates are replicable "two-stage least squares" estimates or "inef-
ficient two-stage least squares" although only 2SLS and OLS are non-deceitful. The divergence 
between the "rational choice" estimate and the transparent 2SLS estimate can be thought of as 
transparency bias. Such bias persists through the case of N=l600.10 
Table 1: Normal Exogenous Variables 
100,000 Replications 
N=25 N=lOO N:400 N:l600 
Bias Efficiency Bias Efficiency Bias Efficiency Bias Efficiency 
OLS 0.40 0.35 0.40 0.08 0.40 O.o2 0.40 0.02 
2SLS 0.03 1.00 O.ot 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
C-Min -0.21 0.27 -0.09 0.48 -0.04 0.54 -0.02 0.54 
C-Max 0.17 0.58 0.08 0.66 0.04 0.63 0.02 0.63 
Min -1.74 0.00 -0.22 0.14 -0.09 0.21 -0.04 0.21 
Max 1.87 0.00 0.16 0.32 0.08 0.30 0.04 0.30 
While the bias declines in absolute value as N increases, the reduction in bias from increas-
ing N by a factor of four can be held in check by moving from the C-Max (C-Min) to Max 
(Min). This suggests that the problem of convergence will depend upon how the possible models 
increase as N increases. The simulation considered only exogenous variables which were truly 
included in the structure. We leave the problem of identifying the system by employing random 
numbers for future research. The problem of "pseudo-identification" raises theoretical questions 
that emerged at the dawn of simultaneous equation estimation and seem to have re-appeared in a 
new guise.11 
The literature on the economics of expert witnesses has supposed that the jury decision will 
be made on the basis of an average of such biased estimates. This average is what the jury 
believes to be true. The conclusion of Froeb & Kobayashi (1996) for the case of biased experts 
before a jury, is that the average of their estimates will be unbiased. 12 And, it will be obvious 
10Judging from 10,000 experiments the bias persists through N=6400. If the bias were measured in terms of the 
median of the estimates instead of the mean, it too would persist. The experiments were repeated with all exogenous 
variables following a uniform distribution between 0 and I. Since it is not surprising that the amount of the bias is 
acutely sensitive to the distribution of the omitted exogenous variables, these results are not reported. 
"We have benefitted from a conversation with Arthur Goldbergerabout the concerns of the Cowles Commission 
on pseudo-identification of structural equation estimates and with Adolf Buse on the modern discussion of weak:-
identification. 
12In this, they are followed by Posner who contends that this property of a competitive procedure makes the 
idea of a court-appointed expert witness unwarranted: "The use of a court-appointed expert is problematic when 
(for example, in the damages phase of the case) the expert witness's bottom line is a number. For then, in the 
case of opposing witnesses, the trier of fact can 'split the difference,' after weighting each witness's estimate by its 
plausibility" (Posner, 1999, p. 1539). 
46 Game Theory and Linguistic Meaning 
from the tables above that, roughly speaking, the policy determined by the average of Min and 
Max or by the average of C-Min and C-Max will be unbiased. 
However, this policy will have a higher variance than a policy determined by both using 2SLS. 
Thus, we create the familiar prisoner's dilemma in statistical context. While it is in the interest 
of each statistician considered separately to engage in selective under-reporting of results, it is in 
the interest of the statisticians considered as a group not to under-report. This is shown by the 
result that the diagonal element is roughly unbiased but the cell where both statisticians engage 
in "bias seeking" behavior has lower statistical efficiency than when they restrain themselves. 
As an illustration of the point, a simulation of a quarter million replications was conducted 
to generate the statistician's dilemma using the case of normal exogenous variables with N=400. 
Here bias is computed in terms of deviation from the 2SLS estimate so as to represent the trans-
parency bias. The efficiency is now the mean square error relative to the minimum where bias is 
measured in terms of deviation from the mean 2SLS estimate. 
Table 2: Econometrician's Dilemma 
Normal Exogenous Variables, N=400 
250,000 Replications 
2SLS C-Min Min 
Bias Efficiency Bias Efficiency Bias Efficiency 
2SLS 0.00 1.00 ·-0.02 0.81 -0.05 0.50 
C-Max O.Q2 0.88 0.00 0.97 -0.03 0.73 
Max 0.04 0.64 0.02 0.92 -0.01 0.86 
The optimistic conclusion of Froeb & Kobayashi ( 1996), followed by Posner ( 1999), depends 
upon their exclusive focus ·on the problem of bias. But if variance is also an issue, because one 
worries about the efficiency of the process, then their optimism about the unrestricted competitive 
process of expert witness seems more complicated than they suggest. A rule which constrains 
experts to report only 2SLS results would have a smaller variance than the competitive process 
modeled above. 
4 CONCLUSION 
Even under the idealized conditions described above, competition generates the obvious 
problem of a prisoners' dilemma. This results from a convention which, contrary to those 
modeled in Lewis (1969), forms the basis of conflict rather than co-ordination. The result sug-
gests that it should be possible to propose a pareto superior convention. We offer one such, a 
computationally-intensive version of final-offer arbitration, in Levy & Peart (2006). 
For the larger project at hand, game theory and semantics, we have presented a tiny model 
of an enormous problem. How does the ordinary person deal with advice, carried in language 
and reporting conventions, from motivated experts? Warts and all, competition provides one 
answer. Yet the harder problems emerge when the incentives of experts are so asymmetric that 
there is no viable competition at a level of statistical detail. Our study of the eugenic episode 
in statistics and economics (Peart & Levy, 2005) finds very little competitive opposition to this 
ghastly "scientific" development. 
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One promising approach to deal with the rational choice of statistical deceit comes out of 
biomedical research, in which clinical trials are quite literally matters of life and death (Berger 
et al., 2006). The authors suggest that experts, who are sympathetic to patients being victimized 
by the advice flowing from ill-designed clinical statistical procedures, might follow the thought 
experiment of John Rawls. So, medical experts would imagine themselves behind a veil of 
ignorance in which their private rational choice considerations are set aside. 
In the context of the research design, the "veil of ignorance" idea would require that re-
searchers agree to construe as optimal only those design methods that all research would 
willingly assent antecedentially (i.e., before they had looked at a particular set of data.) 
(Berger et al., 2006) 
Our suggestion of statistical arbitration might be one method that passes the deep test pro-
posed by Rawls. If an expert will not pre-commit to a procedure, his clients might well have a 
good reason to ask why not. 
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